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Water rights and water use problems created by intervening
national boundaries are usually resolved by resort to international law
and treaties. In this article Professor Waite considers the effect
and limitations of existing United States Treaties with the bordering
countries of Canada and Mexico on the power of Western States to
create water rights, how existing and future individual users may be
affected and how customary international law is relevant to the interpretation of these treaties.

INTERNATIONAL LAW AFFECTING
WATER RIGHTS IN THE
WESTERN STATES t
G. Graham Waite*
INTRODUCTION

W

ATECOTRSES, watersheds, and demands to use water
do not respect national frontiers. Disputes over the
use of a resource common to more than one nation are resolved
by application of international law, which, in addition to
treaties, includes generally accepted principles limiting national sovereignty. These principles are called "customary
international law" and guide the International Court of
Justice, or other international tribunals, in pronouncing
judgment.1 The substance of customary international law
The manuscript for this article was prepared under a contract with the
U.S. Department of Agriculture for use in a multiple-volume work being
prepared by Wells A. Hutchins on State water rights laws of the nineteen
western States. Its separate publication as an article is with the permission
and cooperation of the Natural Resource Economics Division, Economic
Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture.
* Professor of Law, The Catholic University of America; B.S. 1947, L.L.B.
1950, S.J.D. 1958, University of Wisconsin; Member of the Iowa and
Wisconsin Bars.
1. GRIFFIN, LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE USE OF SYSTEMS OF INTERNATIONAL WATERS,
t

STATE DEPARTMENT MEMO.,

S. Doc. No. 118, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 63 (1958).
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may be inferred from similar provisions in a number of
treaties.' In 1958 William Griffin of the State Department
analyzed over 100 treaties 3 at some time governing systems
of international waters and summarized the substance of
customary international law as follows :'
Bearing in mind that as used in this study
"system of international waters" refers to an inland
watercourse or lake, with its tributaries and distributaries any part of which lies within the jurisdiction of two or more states, and "riparian" and
"coriparian" refer to states having jurisdiction over
parts of the same system of international watersit is believed that an international tribunal would
deduce the applicable principles of international law
to be along the following lines:
1. A riparian has the sovereign right to make
maximum use of the part of a system of international
waters within its jurisdiction, consistent with the
corresponding right of each coriparian.
Comment-The doctrine of sovereignty is a
fundamental tenet of the world community of states
as it presently exists. Sovereignty exists and it is
absolute in the sense that each state has exclusive
jurisdiction and control over its territory. Each
state possesses equal rights on either side of a
boundary line. Thus riparians each possess the right
of exclusive jurisdiction and control over the part of
a system of international waters in their territory,
and these rights reciprocally restrict the freedom of
action of the others.
2. (a) Riparians are entitled to share in the use and
benefits of a system of international waters on a
just and reasonable basis.
(b) In determining what is just and reasonable
account is to be taken of rights arising out of(1) Agreements,
(2) Judgments and awards, and
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 89-91. The International Law Association at its Helsinki Conference
in 1966 approved a statement of customary international law more detailed
than that of Mr. Griffin. See INT'L LAW ASS'N REPORT, COMMITTEE ON THE
USES OF THE WATERS OF INTERNATIONAL RIVERS, Helsinki, February 1966.

The two statements are not in disagreement, but the ILA statement explicitly applies to underground as well as surface waters. (Article I.)
5. The Comments are those of Mr. Griffin.
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(3) Established lawful and beneficial uses;
and of other considerations such as(4) The development of the system that has
already taken place and the possible future development, in the light of what is a reasonable use of the
water by each riparian;
(5) The extent of the dependence of each
riparian upon the waters in question; and
(6) Comparison of the economic and social
gains accruing, from the various possible uses of
the waters in question, to each riparian and to the
entire area dependent upon the waters in question.
Comment-The foregoing is an attempt to
formulate the factors which would be considered in
applying the doctrine of "equitable apportionment"
because whatever the situation-whether in negotiation or before a tribunal-more guidance is needed
than is contained in the words "equitable apportionment." Other factors should doubtless be
included.
Perhaps an additional factor would be that the
order of priority of uses of a particular system
would be the relative importance of the possible
different uses to the international area served by
the system. It is doubtful that a statement of priority
among uses of water for all systems could be made
as a matter of existing law. On some systems the
navigational use is of paramount importance; on
others irrigation would surely come next after
drinking and domestic uses.
It is believed that existing law gives priority
to factors 1-3 in the order named, but not to other
factors. Even so it may be difficult to balance the
various factors because they would have different
weights in different situations. For example, one
riparian may have delayed developing uses of the
part of a system in its territory much behind another
riparian. On the one hand, the latter should not have
its investment impaired by subsequent uses by the
former; on the other hand, the former should not
be deprived of the opportunity for its own development. In such a situation the benefits accruing to
the latter under the priority factors would be taken
into account in determining the just and reasonable
apportionment of the total possible uses and benePublished by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1969
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fits of the system. The balancing of rights with the
obtention of maximum benefits to all riparians in
most situations can probably only be done by joint
planning and/or construction with agreed distribution of benefits. E.g. irrigation and power.
3. (a) A riparian which proposes to make, or allow,
a change in the existing regime of a system of international waters which could interfere with the realization by a coriparian of its right to share on a just
and reasonable basis in the use and benefits of the
system, is under a duty to give the coriparian an
opportunity to object.
(b) If the coriparian, in good faith, objects and
demonstrates its willingness to reach a prompt and
just solution by the pacific means envisaged in article
33(1) of the Charter of the United Nations, a riparian is under a duty to refrain from making, or
allowing, such change, pending agreement or other
solution.
Comment-It seems clear that there is no rule
of international law that a riparian must have the
consent of coriparians as a condition precedent to
the use and development within its territory of a
system of international waters. In other words, a
coriparian does not have what in effect would amount
to a veto over changes in the system.
However, in current international practice no
riparian goes ahead with exploitation of its part of
a system when a coriparian may possibly be adversely affected, without consulting the latter and coming
to an understanding with it. It is to be noted that
the latter's consent need not be expressly given;
having been given an opporunity to object, its
silence may be taken as consent. If a coriparian
frivolously objects that injury may possibly be
caused in its territory, the riparian has the power to
proceed. The crux of this aspect of the matter is
that friendly states desirous of conducting their
mutual relations in good faith under the rule of law
do in factseek solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation,
conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or
other peaceful means of their own choicehttps://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol4/iss1/2
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as envisaged in article 33(1) of the United Nations
Charter.
Riparians are also doubtlessly motivated to seek
agreement because of recognition that under the
international law of responsibility of states, a riparian which alters the character of the bed or flow of
a system of international waters is responsible if
injury is thereby caused to a coriparian. The concept of injury in international law is very complex;
and it is difficult to set an absolute limit beyond
which the injury is sufficient to provide legitimate
grounds for opposing action taken by a riparian.
Moreover, responsibility means a duty to make reparation for an injury; and reparation may consist of
pecuniary or specific restitution, specific performance, monetary damages, or some combination of
these. It might be a vast responsibility to make
pecuniary reparation or restore a status quo. Consequently, it is very important that riparians come
to an agreement in advance, so that such responsibility would not arise. Their agreement upon the
distribution of benefits is in effect an indemnification in advance.
The spirit of accommodation running through the principles Mr. Griffin states is a far cry from the conclusion in
1895 of then United States Attorney General Judson Harmon
that because a nation has sovereignty over water found within
its boundaries, even though in its natural channel the water
flows into another nation, the upstream nation has no obligation to share the water with the downstream nation.6 It
appears likely that the Harmon doctrine is an incorrect statement of international law.'
6. 21 Op. ATT'Y. GEN. 278 (1895).
7. INT'L LAW ASS'N REPORT, COMMITTEE ON THE USES OF THE WATERS OF
INTERNATIONAL RIvERs, Helsinki, February, 1966 [hereinafter cited as the
HELSINKI RULES], in Article IV states that "Each basin State is entitled to
a reasonable and equitable share in the beneficial uses of the waters of the
international drainage basin." The Comment to Article IV remarks that
the article reflects a "key principle" of international law, that it "rejects"
the Harmon doctrine, and that "The Harmon Doctrine has never had a wide
following among states and has been rejected by virtually all States which
have had occasion to speak out on the point." The Comment cites the
dispute between Bolivia and Chile over the Lauca River and the Jordan
Basin dispute between Israel and various Arab states as examples of recent
water controversies in which all parties adhered to the principle of reasonable sharing. See HELSINKI RULES, p. 10.
In commenting on the Harmon Doctrine, GRIFFIN, supra, note 1, at
9-10, treats it as a case of special pleading, an ad hoc legal principle invented
for convenience in dealing with claims of Mexico to share the waters of the
Rio Grande. Mr. Griffin points out that even in disposing of the claims that
gave rise to the doctrine, the United States did not act upon it, but instead

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1969
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Treaties between nations establish by agreement of the
signatory parties explicit rules by which particular problems
are to be resolved. The explicit rules to some extent supplant
customary international law while at the same time customary international law may be used to interpret doubtful
language of the rules.
The federal government has power to enter into treaties
with foreign nations,' and this power is explicitly denied
the states.' Treaties into which the United States enters
with other countries become part of the supreme law of the
land" and therefore take precedence over state law to the
extent there is conflict. The Constitution contains no express
reference to customary international law, but at least to the
extent it is used to interpret treaty language, customary
international law also supplants conflicting state law. Further than this, the possibility exists that a given problem
might be deemed, as a choice of law matter, to be controlled
by customary international law rather than by state or
federal law.
The power of western states to create water rights is
limited by treaties with Canada and Mexico. Those with
Canada are the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909," and the
Columbia River Treaty of 1961 ;1" with Mexico the Rio Grande
Irrigation Convention of 1906,"8 and the Rio Grande, Colorado and Tijuana Treaty of 1944.14 The effects of each treaty
will be considered in turn.

8.
9.
10.
11.

apportioned the water. Nor in the case of Canada did the United States
stand upon its territorial sovereignty to deny all obligation to share the
water, but, again, apportioned. At 60-61 Griffin shows the United States
negotiators of the Boundary Waters treaty of 1901, infra note 11, did not
believe the Harmon Doctrine legally sound. And see PIPER, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE GREAT LAKES 101, n.85 (1967) where Mr. Piper states
the United States considers the Harmon doctrine incorrect.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
U.S. CONST. art. VI.
Treaty with Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters Between the
United States and Canada, Jan. 11, 1909. 36 Stat. 2448 (1910), effective
May 13, 1910 [hereinafter cited as BOUNDARY WATERS TREATY].

12. 15 U.S.T. 1555, T.I.A.S. No. 5638.
13. Rio Grande Irrigation Convention with Mexico, May 21, 1906, 34 Stat. 2953
(1907), T.S. No. 455, effective Jan. 16, 1907.
14. Treaty of February 8, 1944, with Mexico respecting utilization of waters
of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande, 59 Stat. 1219
(1945), T.S. 994. A third treaty with Mexico, the Rio Grande Rectification
Convention of 1933, 48 Stat. 1621 (1933), T.S. No. 864, effective Nov. 13,
1933, concerns straightening the Rio Grande river-course in the El PasoJuarez Valley. The treaty resulted in some transfers of land parcels between
the two nations and previously acquired water rights within such parcels

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol4/iss1/2
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73

THE BOUNDARY WATERS TRFATY OF 1909

The treaty defines boundary waters "as the waters from
main shore to main shore of the lakes and rivers and connecting waterways, or the portions thereof, along which the international boundary between the United States and the Dominion of Canada passes, including all bays, arms, and inlets
thereof."'" Not included are "tributary waters which in
their natural channels would flow into such lakes, rivers,
and waterways, or waters flowing from such lakes, rivers,
and waterways, or the waters of rivers flowing across the
boundary.""1 The only waters west of the Lake of the Woods
coming within the definition, other than small sections of
rivers, are said to be those of the Portland Canal between
British Columbia and the Alaska Panhandle." Nonetheless,
the Boundary Waters Treaty has a large potential for affecting water rights, a potential now achieved only in minor
degree. As discussed hereafter, the treaty also affects use
of waters flowing across the boundary. Not counting waters
draining less than 100 square miles upstream from the international boundary, sixty-seven western rivers cross the
boundary."8 Investigations that might be requested under
the treaty could affect rights to use surface and groundwater
as well.
Its preamble indicates the broad scope of this treaty.
There, both the governments of Canada and the United States
say they are
[Elqually desirous to prevent disputes regarding
the use of boundary waters and to settle all questions
which are now pending between the United States
and the Dominion of Canada involving the rights,
obligations, or interests of either in relation to the
other or to the inhabitants of the other, along their
apparently were wiped out. Article VII of the treaty states that such
parcels "shall pass to each Government respectively in absolute sovereignty
and ownership, and without encumbrance of any kind, and without private
national titles." However, the treaty did not affect states' control of water
rights pertaining to land within their boundaries; it simply changed the
boundary somewhat. Hence the treaty is not pertinent to this study.
15. Supra, note 11, Preliminary Art., 86 Stat. 2448.
16. Id.
17.

BLOOMFIELD & FITZGERALD, BOUNDARY

WATER PROBLEMS OP CANADA AND

THE UNITED STATES (1958). Appendix 7, at 248. The treaty provides for
free commercial navigation of boundary waters by inhabitants and vessels
of both countries, subject to appropriate, nondiscriminatory regulations of
either country with its own territory. Supra note 11, Art. I, at 2449.
18. Id., Appendix 8 at 250-251 lists the rivers in detail.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1969
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common frontier, and to make provision for the
adjustment and settlement of all such questions as
may hereafter arise.1"
The treaty created the International Joint Commission2 "' as
the agency through which questions arising along the frontier
might be resolved. The IJC, with the national government
within whose territory the action is to take place, controls
the establishment of any new use, obstruction or diversion of
boundary waters, affecting the natural level or flow of
boundary waters on the other side of the boundary,2 of waters
flowing from boundary waters,22 and of waters at a lower
level than the boundary in rivers flowing across the boundary,
the effect of which is to raise the natural level of waters on
the other side of the boundary." The treaty states each
national government on its own side of the boundary has
equal and similar rights to use boundary waters, 4 and establishes use preferences the Commission is to follow in disposing
of applications. Most preferred are uses for domestic and
sanitary purposes; next are uses for navigation, including
servicing canals for navigation; lowest in preference are
uses for power and irrigation. A use substantially conflicting
with a use of higher precedence must not be allowed.25 An
application may be denied if the proposed use would pollute
boundary waters or waters flowing across the boundary. The
treaty does not in terms place pollution problems within the
Commission's judicial power. But it does declare "boundary
waters and waters flowing across the boundary shall not be
polluted on either side to the injury of health or property
on the other," 2 and the Commission treats the quoted language as a rule of general application. 7
The IJC also has jurisdiction to investigate "questions
or matters of difference" arising between the two countries
"involving the rights, obligations, or interests of either in
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Supra, note 11.
Id., Art. VII, at 2451.
Id., Art. III, at 2449-50.
Id., Art. IV, VIII, at 2450-52.
Id.
Id., Art. VIII, at 2451-52.
Id.
Id., Art. IV, at 2450.
Welsh & Heeney, International Joint Commisin-United States and
Canada, (Paper 217 presented at the Intl' Conference on Water for Peace,
Washington, D.C., May 23-31, 1967). The authors are, respectively, the
chairman of the United States and Canadian Sections of the Commission.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol4/iss1/2
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relation to the other or to the inhabitants of the other, along
the common frontier."2 " This jurisdiction may only be invoked by the national governments." Unlike its power when
exercising other jurisdictions,"0 the Commission cannot make
a binding decision of matters it investigates, but it can state
its conclusions and recommendations to the two governments."
Most of the Commission's work in recent years has fallen
within its investigative power.8 2
One portion of the treaty not within IJC jurisdiction
reserves to the two national governments, or to the several
state and provincial governments "exclusive jurisdiction and
control over the use and diversion, whether temporary or
permanent, of all waters on its own side of the line which in
their natural channels would flow across the boundary or
into boundary waters."" 8 At the same time the treaty provides that "any interference with or diversion from their
natural channel of such waters . . .resulting in any injury

on the other side of the boundary, shall give rise to the same
rights and entitle the injured parties to the same legal remedies as if such injury took place in the country where such
diversion or interference occurs."' And each nation reserves
its right to object to any interference or diversion of water
within the other nation that will materially injure navigation
interests within the first nation.5
28. BOUNDARY WATERS TREATY, Art. IX, 36 Stat. 2452.
29. Id. The treaty says "either" government may refer a question for investigation, but the practice of each government has been to make only those
references the other government desires also. Waite, The InternationalJoint
Commission-Its Practices and Its Impact on Land Use, 13 BUFF. L. REV.
93 at 111 (1963).
30. See supra notes 21-25 and infra note 31.
31. BOUNDARY WATERS TREATY,Art. IX, 36 Stat. 2452. Art. X of the treaty does
provide for decision by the Int'l Joint Comm'n, if the national governments
request it. To date such a request has never been made. Welsh & Heeney,
supra note 27.
32. Since 1944 its investigative power has been invoked twenty-one times compared to only thirteen times for the judicial. Welsh & Heeney, 8upra note 27.
For further discussion of the treaty and of the IJC, see BLOOMFIELD
AND FITZGERALD, BOUNDARY

WATER PROBLEMS OF CANADA AND THE UNITED

STATES (1958); MANN, ELLIS & KRAusz, WATER-USE LAW IN ILLINOIS 271-

276 (1964); Waite, The InternationalJoint Commission-Its Practices and
its mpact on Land Use, 13 BUFF. L. REv. 93 (1963).
33. BOUNDARY WATERS TREATY, Art. II, 36 Stat. 2499.
34. Id. Art. II excludes from "this provision" cases existing when the treaty
became law and cases expressly covered by special agreement. It is unclear
whether "this provision" refers to the reservation of exclusive control or to
the creation of remedies for certain injuries, or both. The existence of the
Chicago diversion of Lake Michigan at the time the treaty was negotiated
and the United States desire to preserve the diversion makes it probable
only the remedies are excluded. See PIPER, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE
GREAT LAxES (1967) at 90-102.
35. BOUNDARY WATERS TREATY, Art. II, 36 Stat. 2449.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1969
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It is hard to know what the quoted provisions mean.
Does "legal remedies" exclude equitable remedies, or does
the phrase simply mean "judicial remedies"? The view has
been expressed that equitable remedies are excluded,3" one
commentator saying that otherwise the exclusive jurisdiction
and control given each country over water on its own side of
the boundary would be undermined." But surely no such
inconsistency arises, as the equitable remedy is enforced by
a court of the country where the action complained of occurs.
The most that can be said is that the exclusive control is
being exercised by the judicial branch of government. If a
state or provincial court is involved there still is no inconsistency-the state court simply would be enforcing a federal
right. As in other such situations, its decision would be
appealable to the federal courts."
When one thinks of a private citizen of one country
seeking a remedy for harm caused by the government of the
other country it does seem unlikely that other sovereignty
would have agreed to subject itself to injunctive relief sought
by a foreigner. But does it seem much more likely that it
would submit to an injunction sought by one of its own people?
If in some circumstances a nation does allow equitable remedies to its citizens against the national government, is it so
unlikely that in similar circumstances it would allow similar
relief to persons of a neighboring country? It is not necessary
to interpret "legal remedies" as used in Article II restrictively in order to protect sovereign nations from injunctive
relief sought by their own citizens since such protection is
already provided by doctrines of sovereign immunity and
Article II only calls for the "same" remedies for the foreign
injury as the domestic. Furthermore, Article II contemplates
remedies for injuries caused by "any" interference with or
86. MANN, ELLis & KRAUSZ, WATER-UsE LAW IN ILLINOIS 273 (1964); Scott, The
Canadian-AmericanBoundary Waters Treaty: Why Article 11, 36 CAN. BAR.
REV. 511, 516-517, 528 (1958).
87. Scott, supra note 36, at 528.
38. The statement of Secretary of State Root before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is not inconsistent with the views set forth in the text. In
speaking of Article II, the Secretary said, "This provision creates the same
situation on the part of the people on either side of the line between the
United States and Canada as now exists on either side of the respective
lines between our State (New York) and Pennsylvania, for example." But
he then illustrated the expected operation of Article II with a situation
contemplating the payment of damages. Proceedings of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 270, 271 (Jan., Feb., 1909). Quotation in Scott,
supra note 86, at 516.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol4/iss1/2
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diversion of waters, not just those caused by government.
One may doubt whether a nation would subject its own private
citizens to the remedy of money damages if properly sought
by an alien yet protect them from injunctive relief. The
meaning of "legal remedies" must remain speculative until
attempts to obtain the remedies are made. No attempts had
been made through October, 1967."9
And what of the exclusive jurisdiction language of Article II? If it is taken literally, the Harmon doctrine appears
to have been incorporated into the treaty. It has been said
the Canadian negotiator, Sir George Gibbons, believed this
to be so.4" But is such incorporation consistent with preserving each nation's right to protest interference harming navigation? One student of the treaty has concluded that the
American negotiator, Chandler P. Anderson, did not share
this belief and that in fact Article II does not incorporate
the Harmon doctrine.' Another writer has suggested Mr.
Anderson may have viewed the article as an appropriate
4
distinction between boundary waters and tributary waters. "
It is also possible the article was largely prompted by American desires to protect the Chicago diversion of Lake Michigan
water. The diversion existed at the time the treaty was
negotiated, had already engaged the two nations' attention,
and definitely was considered by negotiators of both counPIPER, supra note 34, at 78; interview with William A. Bullard, Secretary
to the United States Section, INT'L JOINT COMM'N, October 30, 1967.
40. PIPER, supra note 34, at 77.
41. GaIFIN, supra note 1, at 6-61. Apparenty, Mr. Anderson made no direct,
written statement regarding the Harmon doctrine and its relation, or lack
thereof, to Article II. Mr. Griffin reports that no mention of the Harmon
doctrine in any connection appears in the letters and memoranda of Mr.
Anderson to the Secretary of State or in the Secretary's correspondence with
the British Ambassador. Further, in a report to the Secretary of State
submitted to the Secretary in December, 1907, on the draft treaty, Mr.
Anderson commented that the doctrine that boundary waters are held in
common is inconsistent with the principle of absolute sovereignty of each
nation up to the international boundary. Mr. Anderson went on to say
that "absolute sovereignty carries with it the right of Inviolability as to
such territorial waters, and inviolability on each side imposes a coexistence
restraint upon the other, so that neither country is at liberty to so use its
own waters as to injuriously affect the other." Mr. Anderson then summarized the uses international law would permit each country to make of
water on its side, as being those "which did not interfere with the coexistence
rights of the other, and was not injurious to it .... " The quotations appear
in Griffin, at 60-61. Considering the quotations and the failure to mention
the Harmon doctrine in correspondence, Mr. Griffin concludes that Mr.
Anderson did not believe the Harmon doctrine legally sound, and that neither
Mr. Anderson nor other Americans connected with negotiating the treaty
intended the doctrine to be incorporated into the treaty.
39.

42. PIPER, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE GREAT LAKES 78 (1967).

Mr. Piper

gives no specific reason for suspecting Mr. Anderson considered Article II
expressed a distinction that should be drawn generally.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1969

11

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 4 [1969], Iss. 1, Art. 2
LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. IV

tries. 3 Article II excepts the remedy provision from application to "cases already existing," which is consistent with
a purpose to protect the Chicago diversion if "cases" mean
incidents and activities such as the diversion." Elihu Root,
who was Secretary of State when the treaty was negotiated,
stated to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, that
the treaty excluded the Chicago diversion." A 1958 memorandum of the State Department interpreted Article II as
follows:
1. The "use and diversion" in each country of
waters "which in their natural channels would flow
across the boundary or into boundary waters" is not
subject to the consent of the other country.
2. The "use and diversion" in each country of such
waters is subject to applicable principles of customary international law; except that neither country
may assert througt diplomatic channels, on behalf of
private parties sustaining injury in its territory, the
international legal responsibility of the other country
if there is available to them
compensation under the
46
law of the latter country.
The International Joint Commission has used language
inconsistent with the second portion of the quotation. In a
recent official report to the governments of Canada and the
United States the Commission discussed apportionment between the two countries of waters in a river crossing the
boundary. It quoted the exclusive jurisdiction language as
being a "principle" stated by Article II, pointed out that the
river the Commission was considering crossed and recrossed
the boundary, thereby making each country an upstream
nation under Article II, and concluded that this circumstance
required each country "to agree" to limit exercise of its
jurisdiction to allow cooperative development."
The inference appears to be that absent such agreement, the Commission assumes each country untrammelled in its power over
water within its boundaries.
43.
44.
45.

46.
47.

See GRIFFIN, supra note 1, at e.g., 7-9, 15-21, 31-33, 35-37.
See MANN, ELLIS & KRAuZ, WATER-USE LAW IN ILLINOIS 272-273 (1964).
U.S. Congress, SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS HEARINGS AND
PROCEEDINGS ON TREATY BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CANADA CONCERNING

BOUNDARY WATERS, 61st Cong. 2d Sess. 3-5 (1910).
GRIFFIN, supra note 1, at 62.
REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION, CANADA AND UNITED
STATES, ON THE COOPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PEMBINA RIVER BASIN

48 (Comm. Print 1967)

[hereinafter is cited as IJC REPORT.]

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol4/iss1/2
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It should be noted that the exclusive jurisdiction aspect
of the Article II meaning puzzle may become less important
as matters are referred to the International Joint Commission for investigation. Immediately following the above
mentioned language in its report, the Commission revealed
that it was itself guided by customary international law in
determining the water apportionment it recommended.4 8 If
the Commission turned to customary international law for
guidance in resolving one matter-water apportionment-not
covered by the Boundary Waters Treaty, it may where other
matters not covered by the treaty are concerned as well. To
the extent it does so, adoption of Commission recommendations by the national governments will bring each nation's
activities within the customary international law limitationi
without regard to Article II.
Article VI of the Treaty effects an apportionment of
St. Mary and Milk river waters and thereby influences Montana water uses directly. The potential influence on water
uses in western states of the International Joint Commission
through its investigatory work is far greater. The IJC's
work in the Pembina River basin of North Dakota and
Manitoba shows the influence in action.
The governments of Canada and the United States on
April 3, 1962, asked the IJC to "investigate and report on
what measures could be taken to develop the water resources
of the Pembina River in... Manitoba and... North Dakota
... [and to] determine what plan or plans of co-operative
development ... would be practicable, economically feasible,
and to the mutual advantage of the two countries." The Corn48. iC REPORT, 48.
49. BouNDARY WATERS TREATY Art. II, 36 Stat. 2451. Art. VI treats the two
rivers and their tributaries as one for purposes of irrigation and power, and
gives each country an equal share of the water. If it affords a more
beneficial use to each country, either country may take more than half the
water from one river and less than half from the other. Each year between
April 1 and October 31, the United States receives priority to 500 cubic feet
per second of Milk river water, or three-fourth of its normal flow-whichever is less-and Canada receives a similar priority to St. Mary river water.
Since the time during which the priorities exist is the irrigation season, as,
in fact, Article VI itself, states, it appears that the priority water may only
be used for irrigation.
50. Identical letters from the Canadian Minister for External Affairs, and the
United States Secretary of State addressed, respectively, to the Canadian
and United States Sections of the IJC. IJC Report, 83.
The reference resulted from IJC recommendations stemming from a
1948 reference to study water uses in the Souris and Red Rivers basins, the
Pembina being a tributory of the Red. IJC REPORT, 1-2.
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mission, in determining the plan, was to consider" (a) domestic water supply and sanitation; (b) control of floods; (c)
irrigation; and (d) any other beneficial uses."" In addition,
the Commission was to recommend an apportionment of
water to achieve the benefits of the plan."
Over five and one-half years later, the Commission has
recommended a plan expected to provide adequate flood control protection, water of suitable quality for municipal and
industrial purposes, and irrigation for 12,800 acres in Manitoba plus 8,500 acres in North Dakota, as well as to provide
one water-related recreational site in Manitoba, three in North
Dakota and better recreational fishing in the area." Either
nation is free to use water apportioned to it in ways other
than those envisaged by the plan so long as the works affecting both countries are built and operated according to plan,
and there is no interference with the similar right of the
other nation."
Adoption of the recommended plan by the two national
governments would make it part of the federal law of the
'United States. Being federal law, the adopted water use plan
would take precedence over any conflicting water rights based
on the state law of North Dakota. 5 There are only a few
water rights actually in use in the Pembina Basin," and they
do not conflict with the planned uses," so no preemption of
existing, state-based water rights will occur. But the plan
leaves only a little room for state creation of water rights
in the future. Of the total annual water yield of the Pembina
basin above Pembilier Dam, to be built near Walhalla, North
Dakota, the plan calls for reserving five percent for non51. TJC REPORT, 83.
.52. Id.
53. U.S. Dept. of State Press Release, for release Dec. 4, 1967, 12:30 p.m.
54. IJC REPORT, 42.
55. This is true even if variations in uses form those recommended by the
Commission are adopted, since the decision to vary would be made by federal
authorities, not state. IJC REPORT, 42.
56. There is virtually no irrigation or industrial use. Only Neche and Pembina
in North Dakota, and Altona and Gretna in Manitoba draw their water
supply from the river. IJC REPORT 15-16, 19; SUMMARY OF THE REPORT TO
THE

IJC BY

THE INTERNATIONAL

PEMBINA

RrvER ENGINEERING

BOARD

5

(Comm. Print 1964) Dec. 1, 1964 at 5. Hereafter the Summary is cited as
SUMMARY, BOARD REPORT.

57. IJC REPORT, 47, 68-69.
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project uses in North Dakota."8 North Dakota law would
control the non-project uses in the United States. 9
The Commission states it was guided by customary international law in recommending an apportionment of Pembina
river waters between Canada and the United States. It used
the statement of principles found in the "Helsinki Rules on
the Uses of Waters of International Rivers," approved by
the International Law Association in 1966, as indicating the
substance of customary international law. The Helsinki Rules
give to each basin nation a reasonable and equitable share of
the beneficial uses of the waters of an international drainage
basin. Determination of what is reasonable and equitable is
made in light of all factors relevant in each case, including
such factors as geography, hydrology, past utilization of the
waters, economic and social needs, and the avoidance of unnecessary wants. The IJC considered all the factors.6"
58. IJC REPORT, 51. Seven percent is to be reserved for non-project use in
Manitoba. Id. The total reservation of twelve percent accords with the
opinions of the Manitoba and North Dakota officials participating in the
Engineering Board's study. Id., 4546.
59. IJC REPORT, 76.

60. The statements in this paragraph are drawn from IJC REPORT, 48-49. The
text of Article V, HELSiNKI RULES, reveals the flexibility the INT'L LAW
ASS'N recommends for tackling apportionment problems. It states:
"(1) What is a reasonable and equitable share within the meaning of
Article I is to be determined in the light of all the relevant factors
in each particular case.
"(2) Relevant factors which are to be considered include, but are not
limited to:
(a) the geography of the basin, including in particular the extent
of the drainage area in the territory of each basin State;
(b) the hydrology of the basin, including in particular the contribution of water by each basin State;
(c) the climate affecting the basin;
(d) the past utilization of the waters of the basin, including in
particular existing utilization;
(e) the economic and social needs of each basin State;
(f) the population dependent on the waters of the basin in each
basin State;
(g) the comparative costs of alternative means of satisfying the
economic and social needs of each basin State;
(h) the availability of other resources;
(i) the avoidance of unnecessary waste in the utilization of waters
of the basin;
(j) the practicability of compensation to one or more of the cobasin States as a means of adjusting conflicts among uses; and
(k) the degree to which the needs of a basin State may be satisfied,
without causing substantial injury to a co-basin State.
"(3) The weight to be given to each factor is to be determined by its
importance in comparison with that of other relevant factors. In determining what is a reasonable and equitable share, all relevant factors
are to be considered together and a conclusion reached on the basis
of the whole."
The Comment following Article V shows the factors listed are not
exhaustive but that still others would be applicable in particular cases. See
HELSINKI RULES, at 11-14.
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The Commission recommends apportioning about 60%
of the annual water yield of the basin above Pembilier Dam
to Canada, and 40% to the United States. 1 This proportion
coincides with the proportion found in each country of the
total drainage area contributing water run-off to the river,
and of the total water contributed to the river.2
Although the plan, if adopted, will cause most water
uses in the North Dakota portion of the Pembina Basin to
be controlled by international agreement rather than state
law, local views entered into the formulation of the plan. The
Commission process 3 of investigation and study in developing
the plan allows participation by officials and residents of the
region. Direct participation is greater by officials than by
residents, but of those officials participating, at least in the
public hearings, many hold elective office in the federal, state,
or provincial government.6 " To some degree the views of the
local people shape those of their elected officials, and thus
the region residents indirectly participate in the planning
process. The Commission recommended in modified form the
plan most favored by those appearing at the public hearings. 5
The development plan on which public hearings were
held resulted from extensive studies of the Pembina basin by
a technical board appointed by the IJC and composed of
three men from each country, all engineers from appropriate
The technical
agencies of the two federal governments."
board was assisted in its work by various government agencies
concerned with differing effects of land aitd water use on
61. IJC REPORT, 76.
62. Id., 46.
63. See Waite, The InternationalJoint Commission-Its Practice and Its Impact
on Land Use, 13 BUFF. L. REv. 93, 110-117 (1963) for details on INT'L JOINT
COMM'N investigative procedures.
64. Two public hearings were held in connection with the Pembina River Reference, one at Manitou, Manitoba; the other at Walhalla, North Dakota. The
list of persons presenting briefs or testimony shows at the Manitou hearing
thirteen public officials, including one Member of Parliament and six
members of the Manitoba legislature, and eleven persons representing interested groups such as towns, regional water commissions, chambers of commerce, and wildlife associations. Only six persons appeared ostensibly
representing only themselves. The Walhalla hearing presents the same
picture: thirteen public officials, including two United States Senators and
two Congressmen, the state governor, two state senators and one state
representative; and eleven persons representing interested groups. Ten
persons apparently represented only themselves. IJC REPORT, 88-90.
65. 65 IJC REPORT, 37, 50, 51. The chief modification is a relocation of land to
be irrigated to place less in North Dakota, more in Canada. See IJC REPORT,
51 and SUMMARY, BOARD REPORT 11.
66. IJC REPORT, 405.
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human life. 7 Thus, the plan reflects more than an engineering viewpoint. The study of the technical board included
engineering and geologic field surveys of the Pembina basin,
and reports of basin hydrology, economic development, and
existing water problems. 8 Included in the latter were flood
damage, drainage, irrigation and its impact on farm practices
and agricultural processing industry, water supply, water
pollution, recreation, game fish production, wildlife habitat.
and existing water control works. 9
The activity of the Commission in the Pembina river
basin suggests that Commission influence on western water
law may make a positive contribution to efficient utilization
of water. Contrary to the judge-made portion of water law,
the allocations of water to different uses the Commission
recommends reflect a detailed consideration of water resources and needs of an entire drainage basin, without regard
to the happenstance of time priorities of existing uses. The
international jurisdiction of the Commission avoids the disabilities state and national boundaries place on efforts of state
legislatures or administrative agencies to promulgate a coherent water use regime for an entire drainage basin. The
Commission allows local participation in the planning process in about the same way a state legislature does. The
principal difference between Commission and state practice
may be in enlarging the stage on which conflicting demands
for water do battle from the state capitol to an international
conference room. Even if a commission plan for river basin
development were not adopted, the data the Commission
gathered in the course of technical investigations may help
lawyers, judges, and legislatures make law a more efficient
tool for achieving optimum use of water than now it is.
67. The participating agencies were: In Canada, Canada Dept. of Agriculture,
Prairie Farm Rehabilitation Admin., Economics Division; Canada Dept. of
Energy, Mines and Resources, Inland Waters Branch; Manitoba Soil
Survey; Manitoba Dept. of Highways, Water Control and Conservation
Branch; Manitoba Dept. of Agriculture, Agriculture and Economics Division; Manitoba Dept. of Health; Manitoba Dept. of Mines and Natural
Resources, Fisheries Branch, Game Branch and Parks Division. In the
United States, U.S. Dept. of the Army, Corps of Engineers; U.S. Dept. of
the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation, Bureau of Outdoor Recreation, Fish
and Wildlife Service, Geological Survey, National Park Service, Fed. Water
Pollution Control Administration; North Dakota State Water Commission;
and North Dakota Dept. of Health. IJC REPORT, 87.
68. SuMMARY, BoARD REPORT 207.
69. Id., 4-7.
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THE COLUMBIA RIVER TREATY OF

1964

This treaty is of limited duration" and focuses on one
goal-the cooperative development by the United States and
Canada of the water resources of the Columbia river basin.
The treaty affects water use in parts of Washington, Oregon,
Idaho and Montana. The bulk of its provisions deal with
engineering matters and the manner in which the various
improvements are to be operated to generate hydroelectric
power and to afford flood protection. Canada is to provide
water storage space' and the United States is to maintain
and operate hydroelectric facilities using the water stored in
Canada.' 2 Canada is to operate its storage facilities so as to
achieve optimum power generation"3 while providing flood
control beneficial to lands in the United States. 4 The detailed
plans of operation are to be made by the two countries jointly,"5 with the United States having the option to cause the
Canadian storage facilities to be operated to provide maximum flood control during periods when flooding is a hazard."
Canada is paid for benefits it confers on the United States. 7
The treaty gives the United States an option for five
years from the ratification date to start building a dam on
the Kootenai River near Libby, Montana, to meet flood con70. Unless sooner ended by ten years written notice, the treaty life is sixty
years. If the ten years' notice is given, such treaty provisions as are necessary to continued operation of facilities built under the treaty remain in
force during the facilities' useful life. No similar saving provision applies
should the treaty end without there having been an early termination.
Treaty with Canada for the Co-operative Development of the Columbia
River Basin, Art. XIX, 15 U.S.T. 1555, 1570; T.I.A.S. 5638 (1964). The
treaty hereafter is designated COLUMBIA TREATY.
71. COLUMBIA TREATY, Art. II, 15 U.S.T. 1558.
72. Id., Art. 111(1), 15 U.S.T. 1558.
73. Id., Art. IV(1), 15 U.S.T. 1558-1559; Annex A, Power 15 U.S.T. 1573-74.
74. Id., Art. IV(2), (3) 15 U.S.T. 1559; Annex A, Flood Control 15 U.S.T.
1572-73.
75. Id., Art. IV, 15 U.S.T. 1558.
Each country is to designate an entity to
formulate and carry out the operating arrangements necessary to implement
the treaty. (Art. XIV, 15 U.S.T. 1566-67). A Permanent Engineering Board
is established of four members, two from each country, to oversee the operations of the entities. (Art. XV, 15 U.S.T. 1967-68).
76. Id., Art. IV (2) (b), (3), 15 U.S.T. 1559.
77. Payment is partially in kind and partially in cash. For the increase in
power generation capability in the United States created by the Canadian
storage, Canada receives power equal to one-half-less certain deductions(COLUMBIA TREATY Art. V, 15 U.S.T. 1561) of that which would be generated by the increased capability if used most effectively for power generation
purposes. (Art. III, 15 U.S.T. 1558). See Art. V (2) (a) (b) (c), 15 U.S.T.
1560 for the deductions.
Canada receives cash payments for flood control provided by Canadian
storage facilities built pursuant to the treaty (Art. VI (1) (2), 15 U.S.T.
1560-61), cash and electric power equal to that lost by operating other
storage facilities to meet flood control needs of the United States (Art. VI

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol4/iss1/2

18

Waite: International Law Affecting Water Rights in the Western States

1969

TREATIES AFFECTING WATER RIGHTS

trol and other needs in the United States.7" Benefits from the
dam accrue to the country in which they occur.7" The reservoir will lie partially in both countries, but its operation will
be under United States control, consistent with International
Joint Commission orders relating to levels of Kootenay Lake."
However, at Canadian request, the United States will consult
with Canada regarding operating changes advantageous to
Canada and adopt the changes if not disadvantageous to the
United States.8 Canada is to prepare and make available
for flooding Canadian land needed for the reservoir," but
as in the case of storage operation, the United States is obliged
to consider modifying the Canadian duty to provide land for
flooding if Canada believes any part of the land no longer
needed, and requests such reconsideration." If the useful life
of the dam endures longer than the treaty, Canada still is
obliged to provide land for the storage reservoir as needed,
except land Canada requires for diversion of the Kootenai
River."4
The Kootenai diversion just alluded to is the only one
the treaty permits for nonconsumptive use if the manner of
the diversion would alter the flow of any water as it crosses
the boundary between the two nations within the Columbia
River basin. 5 In broad terms, the diversion right allows
Canada to transfer the bulk of Kootenai water to the Columbia headwaters, subject to restrictions designed to preserve
the usefulness of Libby dam. 6 Either nation may refer dif-

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

(3), 15 U.S.T. 1561), and, more than sixty years following treaty ratification, cash equal to Canadian operating costs in providing the flood control
plus compensation for Canadian economic losses directly caused by Canada
foregoing alternative uses of the storage used to provide the flood control.
(Art. VI, (4) 15 U.S.T. 1561). Canada may elect to receive electric power
for any portion of the compensation for direct economic losses representing
loss of hydroelectric power. (Art. VI (5), 15 U.S.T. 1561).
COLUMBIA TREATY, Art. XII (1), 15 U.S.T. 1563-64.
Id., Art. XXII (2), 15 U.S.T. 1564.
Id., Art. XII (6), 15 U.S.T. 1564.
Id., Art. XII (5), 15 U.S.T. 1564.
Id., Art. XVII (4), 15 U.S.T. 1564. The storage must be in full operation
within seven years of the date fixed in the construction schedule for commencing construction. COLUMBIA TREATY, Art. XII (8), 15 U.S.T. 1564.
Id., Art. XII (9), 15 U.S.T. 1564.
Id., Art. XII (10), 15 U.S.T. 1564-65.
Id., Art. XIII (1), 15 U.S.T. 1565. Diversion by either nation for any other
nonconsumptiveness is permitted only with consent of the other evidenced
by an exchange of notes.
If the Libby dam is built on schedule, Kootenay waters may not be diverted
during the first twenty years of the treaty's life, but thereafter Canada may
divert up to one and one-half million acre-feet of Kootenay water to the
Columbia headwaters if such diversion reduces the Kootenay flow just
downstream from the diversion no lower than 200 cubic feet per second or
the natural flow. (COLUMBIA TREATY, Art. XIII (2), 15 U.S.T. 1565). Start-
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ferences under the treaty to the International Joint Commission for decision,8 7 or, if the IJC decision is delayed,88 to
arbitration.89 Each country is bound to accept the decision
of the IJC or an arbitration tribunal as final.9
Either nation that breaches the treaty is liable to compensate the other, 1 but neither government is liable to the
other, to private persons or other entities for any injury,
damage or loss occurring in the territory of the other country
caused by acts, failures to act, omissions or delays under the
treaty.9" However, each government within its own territory
will try to remove the cause and lessen the effects of injuries
occurring in the territory of the other.9" A Protocol more
clearly defining Canada's operating commitments and in-

87.
88.
89.

90.
91.

92.

93.

ing sixty years after treaty ratification, and for forty years thereafter,
Canada may divert to the Columbia headwaters any water which, in its
natural channel, would flow in the Kootenay across the international
boundary. COLUMBIA TREATY, Art. XIII (3), 15 U.S.T. 1565. The treaty
language appears broad enough to authorize diversions of tributaries flowing into the Kootenay in Canada. The diversion must not reduce the
Kootenay flow at the frontier below the lesser of 2500 cubic feet per second
or the natural flow, COLUMBIA TREATY, Art. XIII (3), 15 U.S.T. 1565,
except during the last twenty years the diversion right exists the limitation
is reduced to the lesser of 1000 cubic feet per second or the natural flow.
COLUMBIA TREATY, Art. XIII (4), 15 U.S.T. 1565. If the United States does
not exercise its option to build the Libby dam, or, exercising it, fails to meet
the prescribed timed schedule for starting construction of the dam and operation of the storage, Canada may immediately make the "any water" diversion
subject to the lower limitation just started. COLUMBIA TREATY, Art. XIII
(5), 15 U.S.T. 1565-66. The United States may ask Canada to vary its use
of water diverted under the one and one-half million acre-feet authorization.
Canada then is obliged to consult with the United States and, if Canada
determines the variation would not be to its disadvantage, vary the use
accordingly. COLUMBIA TREATY, Art. XII (6), 15 U.S.T. 1566. All diversions, once started, are unlimited in the time they may continue. MacNabb,
The Columbia River Treaty, May 23-31, 1963 (Paper 357 presented at the
Int'l Conference on Water for Peace, Washington, D.C.).
COLUMBIA TREATY, Art. XVI (1), 15 U.S.T. 1568.
The IJC is given three months, or such other period as the two countries
may agree, in which to decide the matter. Columbia Treaty, Art. XVI (2),
15 U.S.T. 1568.
COLUMBIA TREATY, Art. XVI (3), 15 U.S.T. 1568. The arbitration tribunal
is to be composed of three members, each country to appoint one, the third
to be appointed by both. If either country fails to appoint its member, or
if agreement on the third member is not reached within six weeks of the
notice of arbitration, either country may ask the President of the International Court of Justice to appoint the missing member.
COLUMBIA TREATY, Art. XVI (4), 15 U.S.T. 1568.
Id., Art. XVIII (1), 15 U.S.T. 1569. Breaches caused by war, strike, major
calamity, act of God, uncontrollable force or maintenance curtailment are
excepted. The compensation shall be either forfeiture of downstream power
benefits or money not exceeding the actual loss of revenue from sale of
hydroelectric power. Id., Art. XVIII (6), 15 U.S.T. 1570.
Id., Art. XVIII (2), 15 U.S.T. 1569-70. Failure of Canada to start operating its storage facilities, or of the United States to start building the Libby
dam, on time is not a breach if the delay is not wilful or reasonably avoidable. Id., Art. XVIII (4), 15 U.S.T. 1570.
Id., Art. XVIII (3), 15 U.S.T. 1570.
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creasing the power to which Canada is entitled was signed
January 22, 1964."'
The treaty does not in terms pre-empt state jurisdiction
over any particular aspect of water law. But in requiring
Canadian storage facilities to be operated for optimum power
generation, subject to the needs of flood control in the United
States, and in limiting diversion in Canada for nonconsumptive uses,9 5 the treaty materially affects the amount of water
in the Columbia available for appropriation under statecreated rights. Also, the limitation of compensation available
under the treaty appears to make it impossible for an appropriator whose allotment is curtailed in order to implement the
treaty preference of power production to obtain compensation. It is therefore clear that the state-created rights of
appropriators are not property when in conflict with activities
authorized by the treaty, and a hazard of potentially severe
economic losses to appropriators exists.
III.

THE

Rio

GRANDE IRRIGATION CONVENTION OF

1906

As its title suggests, the treaty of 1906 concerns itself
only with apportioning water of the Rio Grande between
Mexico and the United States, to be used in both nations for
agricultural irrigation. The apportionment effected by the
convention applies only to the part of the Rio Grande extending above Fort Quitman, Texas. 6 Mexico is alloted 60,000
acre-feet of water each year, to be delivered in the bed of
the Rio Grande by the United States to a specified point in
Mexico." The water is stored behind a dam near Engle, New
Mexico,9" presently known as the Elephant Butte Dam,9 completed in 1915 when the convention measurement became
operative."' All costs of storage, and delivery to Mexico are
borne by the United States. 1 Delivery is distributed through
the year according to a stated schedule, which is proportionate
94.
95.
96.

15 U.S.T. 1579, T.I.A.S. No. 5638.
The treaty gives each nation the right to divert water for consumptive use.
Protocal, note 94 supra, Section 6.
Rio Grande Irrigation Convention with Mexico, May 21, 1906, Art. IV, 34
Stat. 2953, 2955 T.S. No. 455. The agreement hereinafter is designated
CONVENTION.

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id., Art. I, 34 Stat. 2953-54.
Id., Art. 1, 34 Stat. 2953-54.
2 WATERs AND WATER RIGHTS 474 (Clark ed.)
Jordan & Friedkin, infra note 111.
CONVENTION, Art. III, 34 Stat. 2954-55.
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to the amounts delivered from Elephant Butte reservoir to
irrigate Texas land." 2 If serious drought or serious accident
to the irrigation system in the United States occurs, the water
delivered to Mexico may be reduced proportionately to reductions in delivery to the Texas lands." 3
Mexican protests preceding the Convention of American
diversion of Rio Grande water above the point where the
river became a boundary water elicited the opinion" 4 by
Attorney General Harmon that each nation through which
an international river flows has complete sovereignty over
the portion of the river within its territory and has no obligation imposed by international law to share such portion
with the other nation.0 5 Echoes of the opinion may appear
in two articles of the Convention. Article IV disclaims recognition by the United States of any Mexican claim to the waters
agreed to be delivered to her, while it recites a Mexican waiver
of all claims to use water along a stated stretch of the river,
and settlement or waiver of all past, present and future claims
against the United States for damages caused owners of
Mexican lands by American diversions of Rio Grande water.'
Article V disclaims concession by the United States of any
legal basis for claims by owners of Mexican land for losses
to such land caused by diverting Rio Grande waters within
the United States.0 7 The article also limits application of
the "arrangement" contemplated by the treaty to the part
of the Rio Grande forming the international boundary from
the head of the Mexican Canal above Juarez, Mexico, to Fort
Quitman, Texas." 8
In spite of the hard language of Articles IV and V, and
of the Harmon doctrine that seems to lie behind it, the Convention does apportion the water between the two countries,
a fact mentioned by the State Department some fifty years
later when considering the interest of the United States in
an international river on which the United States was the
102. Id., Art. II, 34 Stat. 2954.
103. Id.
104. 21 Op. ATT'Y. GEN. 279 (1895).
105.

GRIFFIN, LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE USE OF SYSTEMS OF INTERNATIONAL WATERS,

STATE DEPT. MEMO., SENATE DOC. NO. 118, 85th Cong., 22d Sess. 9 (April 21,

1958).
106.

CONVENTION, Art. IV, 34 Stat. 2955.

107. Id., Art. V, 34 Stat. 2955-56.
108. Id., Art. I, V, 34 Stat. 2953-54, 2955-56.
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downstream sovereign."' Because the Convention apportioned the water, it has been concluded that the Harmon doctrine
was not part of the Convention.1 10
It is noteworthy that only the United States government
is protected by the language of Articles IV and V-nothing
is said regarding claims for damages caused owners of Mexican lands by actions in the United States of state or local
governments, corporations or other organizations, or by private persons.
Administrative responsibility of the Convention has been
assigned to the body today known as the International Boundary and Water Commission."' The Department of the Interior operates the dam and arrangements for releasing water
from storage from Mexico are made with the Department
measures and
through the Commission. The Commission
1
maintains records of the deliveries.' 2
IV.

THE Rio GRANDE, COLORADO AND
TIJUANA TREATY OF 1944

A. Water Allocation
The treaty allocates the water of the first two named
rivers between the United States and Mexico, and provides
for study and recommendations for allocating the water of
the Tijuana. The allocation of Rio Grande waters applies
only to the river lying below Fort Quitman, Texas,"' thereby
supplementing rather than replacing the Convention of 1906.
Unlike the Convention of 1906, the 1944 Treaty allocates
109. Supra note 105, at 9-10.
110. Id., at 9.
111, Jordan & Friedkin, The International Boundary and Water CommissionUnited States and Mexico, May 23-31, 1967 (Paper 611 presented at the
Intl. Conference on Water for Peace, Washington, D.C.). The authors are,
respectively, Commissioners of the Mexican and United States Sections of
the Commission.
The Commission is the result of merging the International Water Commission into the International Boundary Commission established in 1889 by
the Boundary Convention with Mexico, March 1, 1889, 26 Stat. 1512. The
merger occurred in 1932. Act of June 30, 1932, ch. 314 § 510, 47 Stat. 417;
Act of July 1, 1932, Ch. 861, 47 Stat. 481, 22 USC 277 note. The present
name of the Commission was created by Art. 2 of the 1944 treaty with
Mexico, infra note 113.
112. Id.
113. Treaty between the United States of America and Mexico respecting utilization of waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande,
Feb. 3, 1944, Preamble, 59 Stat. 1219, 1220, T.S. No. 904. The agreement
hereinafter is designated "1944 TRATY".
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water for storage, domestic, agricultural, stock raising, or
industrial purposes"" rather than simply for agricultural
irrigation.

As indicated in the detailed discussion that follows, implementation of the treaty is assigned to the International
Boundary and Water Commission."' That body consists of
two sections, one from each country, with the head of each
section required to be an engineer.1 1 The Commission as a
whole has jurisdiction over "the limitrophe parts of the Rio
Grande and the Colorado River, to the land boundary between
the two countries, and to works located upon their commojn
boundary." 1 7 Each national section has jurisdiction over
works "located wholly within the territorial limits of either
country" that are used only to fulfill treaty obligations.1 '
Works used partly for treaty purposes and partly for other
purposes are managed by a state or federal agency of the
country where they are located."'
Rio Grande waters are divided as follows. To the United
States: all the waters entering the Rio Grande from the Pecos
and Devils Rivers, Goodenough Spring, and Alamito, Terlingua, San Felipe, and Pinto Creeks;.2 one-half the flow
in the main channel of the Rio Grande below the major international storage dam farthest downstream, to the extent the
flow is not specifically allotted under the treaty;"'. one-third
of all waters entering the main channel of the Rio Grande
from the Conchos, San Diego, San Rodrigo, Escondido, and
Salado Rivers and the Las Vacas Arroyo, provided the third
shall not be less on the average in cycles of five consecutive
years than 350,000 acre-feet;"'. and one-half of all other flows
occurring in the main channel of the Rio Grande, except
waters from the San Juan and Alamo Rivers, and return flow
114. 1944 TREATY, Art. 1 (d), 59 Stat. 1221.
115. Id., Art. 2, 59 Stat. 1222, states that "The application of the present treaty,
the regulation and exercise of the rights and obligations which the two
Governments assumed thereunder, and the settlement of all disputes to
which its observance and execution may give rise are hereby entrusted to
the International Boundary and Water Commission."
116. Id., Art. 2, 59 Stat. 1222-23.
117. Id. at 1224.
118. Id.
119. 1944 TREATY Protocol, 59 Stat. 1261. See 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS
(Clark ed.) § 152.3 (1967) for further discussion of the Commission.
120. Id., Art. 4, B (a), 59 Stat. 1226.
121. Id., Art. 4, B (b), 59 Stat. 1226.
122. Id., Art. 4, BB (c), 59 Stat. 1226-1227.
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from land irrigated from the San Juan and Alamo.'2 3 It is
said the result of the division is to give the United States
about one-half of Rio Grande waters below Fort Quitman
although the greater part of the water is of Mexican origin." '
Each diversion of lower Rio Grande water actually made for
use in either country must be preceded by a finding of the
section of the International Boundary and Water Commission of the country in which the diverted water is to be used
that water is available within that country's share for the
diversion.'2 5
Mexico and the United States agreed to construct jointly
dams required on the Rio Grande for storage and diversion
of the water, the work to be done through each nation's section of the International Boundary and Water Commission.' 2 6
Although the treaty specifies three dams to be built and their
general location, the Commission may decide to build others
instead, subject to the approval of the two nations."' Selection of the most feasible sites, determination of feasible reservoir capacities, of each nation's needs at each site for conservation capacity, and of capacity required for silt retention
and flood control are all made by the Commission. 2 ' In
determining the required conservation capacity, the Commission is to consider the "amount and regimen" of the
particular nation's water allotment and "its contemplated
uses."' 2 9 Thus the Commission is placed in a position to influence powerfully the uses to which land dependent upon the
stored water may be developed. Dams built pursuant to the
treaty are Falcon, a storage dam located seventy-five miles
below Falcon. 3 ° In addition, another storage dam, Amistad,
is being constructed about twelve miles upstream from Del
Rio, Texas, and Ciudad Acuna, Coahuila."' Amistad dam is
to be completed in April, 1969.132 In locating Amistad dam,
the Commission used its power to depart from the sites speci123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id., Art. 4, BB (d), 4 A (a), 59 Stat. 1227, 1225.
2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 483 (1967).
Id., at 492. 1944 TREATY, Art. 9(b), 59 Stat. 1234.
1944 TREATY, Art. 5, 59 Stat. 1228.
Id., Art. 5, II.
Id., Art. 5, II, (a)-(e).
Id., Art. 5, II (e).
Jordan & Friedkin, supra note 111, at 9-10.
Jordan & Friedkin, supra note 111, at 10.
Id.
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fied in the treaty.'3 At both Falcon and Amistad dams electric power is, or is to be, generated for use in both nations." 4
Colorado waters are given to the United States except
1,500,000 acre feet which are guaranteed to Mexico,"3 5 plus
any other quantities arriving at Mexican points of diversion.'
In years when the United States Section of the International
Boundary and Water Commission determines that water
exists surplus to United States need and to the guaranteed
delivery quantity, the United States will deliver additional
water to Mexico. However, the total quantity delivered is not
to exceed 1,700,000 acre-feet, and Mexico acquires no right
by use of Colorado River waters beyond 1,500,000 acre-feet.8 7
Should drought or accident make it hard for the United States
to deliver the guaranteed quantity of water to Mexico, the
treaty allows reduction of the required delivery in proportion
to reduction of consumptive uses in the United States.'
Who shall say when it is difficult for the United States
to deliver all the water guaranteed to Mexico? The treaty
does not expressly settle the question. A general treaty provision entrusts to the International Boundary and Water
Commission the "application of the present Treaty, the
regulation and exercise of the rights and obligations which
the two Governments assume thereunder, and the settlement
of all disputes to which its observance and execution may give
rise." 3 9 Presumably the duty to make the determination in
question falls within the quoted language. If so, the result
is both the Mexican and United States sections of the Commission participate in the decision, which seems logical since
the decision affects performance of the guaranty to Mexico. 4"
The meaning of consumptive use may be more obscure.
The treaty definition of the term includes "evaporation, plant
transpiration or other manner whereby the water is consumed
133. 2

WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS

(Clark ed.) 484 n.86 (1967).

134. Jordan & Friedkin, supra note 111, at 9. Electric power production at the
international storage dams is contemplated by Article 7 of the 1944 Treaty,
59 Stat. 1231.
135. 1944 TREATY, Art. 10 (a), 59 Stat. 1236.
136. Id., Art. 10 (b).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id., Art. 2, 59 Stat. 1222, 1223.
140. It will be recalled that the United States section alone determines that water
above the guaranteed quantity exists that may be given Mexico. See supra
note 137 and related text.
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and does not return to its source of supply. In general, it is
measured by the amount of water diverted less the part thereof
which returns to the stream. "'
Is evaporation from a storage
reservoir created simply by damming the stream a consumptive use I The second sentence quoted above suggests not.
And the treaty definition of "to divert" speaks of "taking
water from any channel in order to convey it elsewhere" for
various purposes,' but it goes on to list several alternative
diversion methods and among them includes "dams across
the channel."' 43 Since the list is in the alternative, it seems
possible the above question might be answered "yes."
The Commission is to plan for flood control on the Colorado below Imperial dam, both in the United States and in
Mexico.'
The two governments will build such Commission
recommended works as the two governments approve, each
government paying for the works it builds-including operating costs after construction, supervision of construction and
operation being provided by the particular country's section
of the Commission." ' As the works are constructed and
operated to achieve flood control, an impact on private water
uses results. The speed of current and the amount of water
in a given reach of river a given season of the year are likely
to be changed. Water uses incompatible with flood control
operations will give way before the overriding treaty provision.'" To enable it to divert its portion of water Mexico
has built the Morelos dam at its expense about one mile below
the international boundary.14 7
141. 1944 TREATY, Art. 1 (j), 59 Stat. 1222.
142. Id., Art. 1 (d), 59 Stat. 1221. (Emphasis supplied.) The purposes are
domestic, agricultural, stock raising, or industrial.
143. Id., Art. 1 (d). ". . . dams across the channel, partition weirs, lateral intakes, pumps, or any other methods."
144. Id., Art. 13, 59 Stat. 1241, 1242.
145. Id. Some works may be jointly operated and maintained by the Commission
as a whole, in which case the cost will be borne equally by the two governments.
146. Other articles of the treaty particularly related to the Colorado are Articles
12, 14 and 15. Art. 12, 59 Stat. 1239 outlines certain works to be built by
each country. Art. 14, 59 Stat. 1242, deals with use of the All-American
Canal in delivering water to Mexico and payments to Mexico to make therefor. Article 16, 59 Stat. 1243, outlines the subject matter and limits of two
annual schedules the Mexican section of the Commission is to formulate
each year to guide United States delivery of water to Mexico and deals with
other details of delivery as well. Article 15 also limits the water to be
delivered through the All-American Canal.
147. Jordan & Friedkin, supra note 111, at 8-9.
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As for the Tijuana river, the treaty makes no precise
water apportionment, calling instead for study and recommendations by the Commission for an "equitable distribution" to be approved by the two governments. 4 ' The Commission also is to recommend storage and flood control plans
to promote and develop "domestic, irrigation and other
feasible uses" of the water. " " Presumably the uses for which
the Commission plans to store water will influence the Commission's recommendations for equitable apportionment.
Since the treaty expressly directs the Commission to plan for
development of domestic and irrigation uses, with other uses
to be included only as the Commission deems feasible, it may
be expected the apportionment ultimately recommended will
tend to accommodate demands for domestic and irrigation
uses first, in preference to other types of use. 5
B.

General Provisions

Several general provisions of the 1944 treaty are noteworthy. First, the Commission is given guidelines to follow
in providing for joint use of international waters. Border
sanitation problems are to receive first preferential attention,
and any sanitary measures or works agreed upon by both
governments override any conflicting water use.' 5 ' Following
water use for sanitation the following priorities are established, listed in descending importance: First, domestic and
municipal uses; 2) agriculture and stockraising; 3) electric
power; 4) other industrial uses; 5) navigation; 6) fishing
and hunting; and 7) any other beneficial uses the Commission
may determine.'5 2 None of the terms are defined in the treaty;
to determine the classification into which a particular use
falls reliance might be placed on customary international law
or the internal law of the two countries. In the case of the
United States this could mean largely the internal law of
each of the states affected by the treaty. It would not seem
proper for the Commission to place its own meaning on the
classifications, since to do so would tend to frustrate the two
governments' purpose to guide the Commission. Of course,
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

1944 TREATY, Art. 16 (1), 59 Stat. 1249.
Id., Art. 16 (2).
No recommendation had been made by June 1, 1967.
1944 TREATY, Art. 3, 59 Stat. 1225.

Id.
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in applying definitions drawn from customary international
law, from internal state law, or from some other body of law,
the Commission necessarily builds its own interpretation of
the body of law being used, an interpretation which, being
rooted in the treaty power of the federal government, is of
such dignity in the United States as to override any conflicting state law.
Another interesting treaty provision shields each country
from liability to the other country for damage caused by using
the international rivers for the discharge of flood waters.'
Responsibility for claims of private persons-apparently
including those harmed in one country by flood waters released
by the other country-is assumed by each government within
whose territory the claim arises."' The claim is to be adjusted
exclusively according with the responsible government's
"own" laws. 5' In the case of a private claimant harmed
within the United States, it would seem the treaty provision
means the claimant's rights are controlled by federal law.
Whether the "law" includes choice of law rules is another
question. The treaty is silent on the point. It may be the word
"own"' suggests an intention that choice of law rules be
excluded from consideration. This perhaps is consistent with
a desire to settle claims speedily. The meaning of the treaty
language is to be found in the practice of the two governments.'5 6
CONCLUSIONS

Treaties of the United States with Canada and with
Mexico have not explicitly pre-empted private water rights
created by the various states adjoining the two frontiers.
However, by apportioning the waters of international and
trans-boundary streams, and by establishing classes of pre153. Id., Art. 17, 59 Stat. 1250.
154. Id., Art. 20, 59 Stat. 1251-1252. The claim may have arisen from the construction operation, or maintenance of any works authorized by the treaty.
155. Id., Art. 20.
156. Another choice of law puzzle exists with reference to the law regulating
public use of lake surfaces formed by international dams. The treaty states
public use is to be free and common to both countries, subject to various
regulations, including "the police regulations of each country in its territory." 1944 TREATY, Art. 18, 59 Stat. 1250. Does this mean, with respect to
territory within the United States, police regulations of the federal government? Or of the several states bordering the international rivers? The
latter would coincide with the tradition of our nation that the police power
is peculiarly within the sphere of the states.
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ferred water uses, the treaties do limit state ability to create
water rights. Only uses fitting within the national share of
water, and within the hierarchy of uses may be effectively
established by the states. Any state-based right to use water is
susceptible to obliteration should it conflict with future treaty
provisions. Whether the private owners of such rights are
compensated for their loss depends on the terms of the treaty,
or separate Congressional action-there is no constitutional
requirement that they be paid. To the extent the international
agencies refine the treaty-established preferences in water
use the possibility exists for planning the water uses of an
entire river basin, without regard to state or national
boundaries.
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